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NATIONAL REVIEW OF WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT REPORTS: IN THE NAME OF




The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations ex-
panded the scope of substantive obligations within the world trad-
ing system to include rules on trade-in-services and trade-related
intellectual property rights.1 This Round also strengthened ex-
isting rules relating to trade-in-goods, including a forty percent
reduction in worldwide tariffs and further constraints on non-
tariff barriers. The seven and one-half year negotiations also fo-
cused on institutional and procedural improvements to the world
trading system.2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) was cre-
ated to supplant the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) as the institution of the world trading system.3 Addition-
ally, an integrated, more "judicial" dispute settlement system was
agreed upon to enhance compliance with the expanded and
strengthened rules of the world trading system.
* Asst. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. J.D., LL.M, University
of Michigan Law School. The author served as a consultant to the National Governors'
Association during development of implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round agree-
ments and for the North American Free Trade Agreement. The views expressed are those
of the author alone. The author would like to thank Professor John Jackson, University of
Michigan, Law School, for his guidance during his LL.M. and S.J.D. research.
I See Judith H. Bello, International Decisions, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 772, 772-75 (1995) (dis-
cussing General Agreement on Trade in Services and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights); see also Mary E. Footer, The International Regulation of
Trade in Services Following Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INr'L LAw. 453, 453-57,
461-63 (1995) (same).
2 See John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or Cau-
tious Small Step forward?, in THE WORLD ECON. 11-31 (1995).
3 See generally Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4
J. INT'L L. & PRoc. 3, 34 (1995) (detailing history of WTO creation). Note that an updated
and revised GATT, the so-called "GATT 1994," establishing rules with respect to trade in
goods, is one of the covered agreements under the WTO institutional umbrella.
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Within the United States, it was the institutional and proce-
dural aspects of the final Uruguay Round agreement that raised
the most controversy. Indeed, congressional approval of the Uru-
guay Round agreements was not secured until the Administration
agreed to support legislation (the so-called "Dole Bill") providing
for a WTO dispute settlement review commission comprised of
federal appellate judges. This commission would review final
WTO dispute settlement panel reports or WTO appellate body re-
ports adverse to the United States in disputes where the United
States was a responding party. In addition, the commission would
review, upon request of the United States Trade Representative,
adverse reports in those cases in which the United States was the
complaining party. The new WTO dispute settlement rules pro-
vide for a right of appeal from dispute settlement panel reports at
the international level, but many of the sovereignty concerns re-
lated to original WTO dispute settlement panels apply to the WTO
appellate body as well.4
The controversy over the new WTO dispute settlement system
and the proposed United States response in the form of a national
WTO dispute settlement review commission raise several impor-
tant questions. At the international level, one can ask whether
the new WTO dispute settlement processes will enhance compli-
ance with WTO rules. If so, will the quid pro quo of this strength-
ened dispute settlement system result in the reduction of national
sovereignty? If yes, then is the establishment of a national WTO
dispute settlement review commission necessary to protect United
States sovereignty? Additionally, will the establishment of this
commission aid or hinder the goal of attaining enhanced compli-
ance with WTO rules through a new dispute settlement system?
While answers to some of these questions are incomplete or in-
definite at this time, or may change as experience under the new
dispute settlement system is gathered, presenting a choice be-
tween enhanced international rule compliance and national sover-
eignty is misleading. The new WTO dispute settlement system
does not trade our citizenship interests for our consumer interests.
4 See Richard 0. Cunningham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We Get What the
United States Wanted, or Did We Give Up the Only Remedy that Really Worked? in TaE
GATT, THE WTO AND URUGUAY RouiN AGREEmENTS AcT 1995, at 547, 559-61 (PLI Comm.
L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 722, 1995) (raising issues of original WTO dis-
pute settlement panels as applied to WTO appellate body).
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Rather, it shelters both of these interests from special protection-
ist interests. The new WTO dispute settlement system does not
threaten United States sovereignty, and the national WTO dis-
pute settlement review commission is not per se necessary to pro-
tect United States sovereignty. Nevertheless, such a commission
can help eliminate any perceived sovereignty concerns and boost
United States public confidence in the system. While this function
is important, perhaps the most important impact that a properly
structured and constrained national WTO dispute settlement re-
view commission could have is the furtherance of WTO rule
compliance.
Part I of this Article reviews the WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding (DSU), which elaborates the new dispute settlement
rules. The discussion highlights a shift toward a more adjudica-
tive model compared to the old GATT dispute settlement system.
Part II analyzes whether the new system will enhance compliance
with rules of the world trading system. Part III discusses the con-
cept of sovereignty and examines whether the new dispute settle-
ment system poses any threat to United States sovereignty. Part
IV explores the United States proposal of a national WTO dispute
settlement review commission as elaborated by the most recent
version of the Dole Bill. The discussion focuses on the functions
served by a national WTO dispute settlement review commission.
This Article concludes that a properly structured and constrained
United States review commission could enhance WTO rule compli-
ance while simultaneously eliminating perceived sovereignty
concerns.
I. TBE NEW WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING
The new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) ap-
plies to disputes under all Uruguay Round agreements.5 While a
few of the agreements contain special rules related to dispute set-
tlement, the new integrated system will largely eliminate the
problems of forum shopping that occurred within the old GATT
5 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter "DSU"I]; see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dis-
pute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT
Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1157, 1205-1224 (1994)(providing exhaustive description and analysis of new WTO dispute settlement system).
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system after the Tokyo Round non-tariff barrier codes entered into
force in 1980.6
The DSU makes several fundamental changes to the old GATT
dispute settlement system. The DSU, however, also relies on pre-
vious practices under the GATT as well as codifications of GATT
practice.7 An outline of the new process under the DSU follows
and highlights the fundamental changes from the previous GATT
system.
A. Consultations and Establishing a Dispute Settlement Panel
Consultations between the parties to a dispute are the first step
in any dispute settlement proceeding.' When a WTO member be-
lieves that its rights or benefits under a WTO agreement have
been nullified and impaired, generally by violation of a rule in a
WTO agreement, it requests consultations with the alleged offend-
ing member.9
Under the DSU, when a member receives a request for consulta-
tions, it must respond within ten days and commence "good-faith"
settlement negotiations within thirty days from the date of the re-
6 See John H. Jackson, Symposium, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institu.
tions, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 11, 21 (1992) (finding that rule-oriented system may allow for
supervisory mechanism); Ingrid Nordren, GATT Panels During the Uruguay Round: A
Joker in the Negotiating Game, 8 J. INr'L ARB. 87, 102 (1991). A prominent example of the
"forum shopping" problem occurred during the United States-European Community dis-
pute over subsidies given to Airbus and whether the dispute should be resolved under the
Subsidies Code or the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. Id.; see also Petersmann, supra
note 5, at 1191 (analyzing effect of new WTO dispute settlement agreement). See generally
Amelia Porges, The WTO and the New Dispute Settlement, 88 AM. Soc'Y INTrL L. PRoc. 133
(1994) (discussing newly integrated system of dispute resolution).
7 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 3(1), at 115. "Members affirm... their adherence to the
principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Article XXII and XXIII
of GATT 1947, as further elaborated and modified [by the DSU]." Id.
8 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 4, at 116 (outlining consultation procedures to be employed
by members).
9 It is possible for a measure which does not violate the GATT 1994 to nullify and impair
benefits. Such non-violation cases under the GATT 1947, however, were relatively rare,
amounting to less than four percent of all cases. See JoHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATioNAL ECONOMic RELATIONS 362-63 (1995). The authors noted that
only three adopted panel reports, two unadopted panel reports, two settled cases, and one
claim rejected by a panel were of the non-violation type-a total of eight cases out of well
over 200 in GATT history. Id. Remedies for non-violation cases are somewhat different
than for violation cases under the new DSU. Id.; see also DSU, supra note 5, art. 26(1), at
130.
Additionally, some WTO agreements do not allow non-violation cases to be brought. See,
e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15,
1994, art. 64(2), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197, 1221 (Annex IC) (1994). Generally, a violation of a
rule constitutes a prima facie case of nullification and impairment. Id.
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quest. 10 If the required response is not forthcoming, or consulta-
tions have not begun or have failed to settle the dispute within
sixty days, the complaining party may request the establishment
of a dispute settlement panel."
Upon such request, a panel is established at the next meeting of
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), unless the DSB decides by
consensus not to establish the panel.12 In reality, the DSB is the
General Council of the WTO, comprised of government represent-
atives of WTO Members, wearing its Dispute Settlement Body
"hat." A "negative consensus," or existence of an objection by
every Member, that would "block" the establishment of the panel,
is a practical impossibility because the party requesting the panel
is not likely to object to its establishment. For this reason, the
DSU can be seen as granting the automatic right to a panel within
a set amount of time. Under the former GATT system, an individ-
ual contracting party, including the party against whom the com-
plaint was directed, had the right to "block" the establishment of a
panel. The old rules required a "positive consensus," or the ab-
sence of an objection by any contracting party. Although delay in
the establishment of panels did not pose a problem in most cases
under the old GATT system,' 3 instances of considerable delay did
occur. 14
B. Composition of WTO Dispute Settlement Panels
Under the terms of the DSU, panels are to be composed of three
"well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individu-
als."' 5 An examination of the former GATT system reveals the re-
cent trend toward the inclusion of non-governmental individuals,
such as academicians and scholars, and away from panels com-
10 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 4(3), at 116 (stating that "all Members will engage in these
procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the disputes").
11 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 11-31 (noting procedural improvements to world trading
system).
12 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 6(1), at 117 (discussing establishment of panel).
13 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GATT, 11 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 84-
85 (1987) (noting lack of delays in most dispute resolutions).
14 See John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in
GATT, 72 Am. J. INT'L L. 747, 779-81 (1978). The DISC case between the United States and
the European Community in the mid-1970s is the worst example of the delay in the estab-
lishment and selection of a panel. Id. Nearly three years had passed before the parties
agreed to the composition of the panel. Id.
15 DSU, supra note 5, at 118 (describing composition of panels as well as participant's
qualifications).
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prised solely of government individuals. 16 Additionally, the DSU
prohibits a citizen of a Member whose government is party to a
dispute from serving on the panel hearing the dispute, unless the
parties to the dispute agree otherwise.' 7 Since a panelist serves in
his or her individual capacity, this prohibition prevents a govern-
ment representative of a party to the dispute from being placed in
a position in which there is a. conflict of interest. The WTO Secre-
tariat nominates panelists, and the parties can oppose such nomi-
nations only for "compelling reasons."'" If parties continue to ob-
ject to the nominated panelists, the WTO Director-General selects
those panelists who would be most appropriate. 19 This procedure
ensures that the automatic right to a panel is not effectively
thwarted or unduly delayed. Members are not permitted to in-
struct panelists or seek to influence them as individuals with re-
gard to matters under consideration.2 0
C. Process of Dispute Settlement Panels
The panel process itself has several stages. 21 Parties to the dis-
pute submit written briefs and present two oral arguments before
the panel. The second presentation is for rebuttal purposes. The
panel then relays the descriptive section of its draft report, which
contains the facts and arguments of the parties, to the disputing
16 See Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does
Not, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 52, 54 (1987). The GAIT contracting parties agreed in November 1984
to the establishment of a roster of potential non-governmental panelists. Id.; see also Im-
provements to the GAT Dispute Settlement Rules & Procedures, GATT, B.I.S.D. (36th
Supp.) at 61 (1989); id. (31st Supp.) at 9 (1984). The DSU does not contain a preference for
government-employed panelists. Id. The 1984 Understanding on Dispute Settlement did
contain such a preference although this was eliminated in the 1989 Understanding on Dis-
pute Settlement. Id.
17 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 8(3), at 119 (enumerating composition of panels).
18 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 8(1), at 119. "The Secretariat shall propose nominations
for the panel to the parties to the dispute. The parties to the dispute shall not oppose nomi-
nations except for compelling reasons." Id.
19 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 8(7), at 112, 119. "If there is no agreement... the Direc-
tor-General... shall determine the composition of the panel by appointing panelists who
the Director-General considers most appropriate . . . ." Id.
20 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 8(9), at 119. "Governments shall therefore not give them
instructions nor seek to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a
panel." Id.
21 See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 368-70 (1995) (discussing appellate body review);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, ICJ and Trade Environment Disputes,
15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1084-85 (1994) (describing various stages of dispute resolution
mechanism); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (setting forth details of
resolution process).
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parties for comment.22 After considering the comments, the panel
provides the parties with an interim report of its findings and con-
clusions with respect to the dispute. The parties are then given an
opportunity to request the panel to review "precise aspects" of the
interim report.23 If there is no request for an interim review, then
the interim report becomes the final report.2 4 If an interim review
request is made, then the panel is required to address, in its final
report, the parties' arguments concerning the interim report.
Though names of the panel members are public, opinions of indi-
vidual panelists are kept anonymous. 25 Specific time deadlines ap-
ply to each stage of the process such that a panel will normally
issue a report within six months from the time it is composed.
D. Automatic Adoption of Panel Reports
Panel reports become international legal obligations only when
adopted by the DSB. Similar to the establishment of panels, the
adoption of panel reports under the DSU is essentially "auto-
matic."26 Specifically, panel reports are automatically adopted
within sixty days from the issuance of the final report unless a
party chooses to appeal the decision, 27 or the DSB decides by con-
sensus not to adopt the report.28 Again, the formation of a nega-
tive consensus is a practical impossibility because, absent ex-
tremely unusual circumstances, the "winner" of the case will not
formally object to adoption of the report.
Under the former GATT system, a "losing" party could "block"
adoption of a panel report because adoption required a positive
consensus. As part of the trade-off for losing the right to "block"
22 DSU, supra note 5, art. 15(1), at 122 (discussing interim review stage).
23 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 15(2), at 122 (stating that "a party may submit a written
request for the panel to review precise aspects of the interim report prior to circulation of
the final report to the Members.").
24 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 15(3), at 122.
25 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 14(1), 14(3), 17(10), 17(11), at 122, 124.
26 See John H. Jackson, Remarks, 86 Paoc. AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 69, 69 (1992) (noting near
automatic provisions under dispute resolution agreements); see also Michael K Young, Dis-
pute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph Over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw.
389, 402 (1995) (recognizing that "[plerhaps the most startling innovation of the [DSU] is
its creation of a rule of almost automatic adoption of panel reports").
27 See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (describing appellate process).
28 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 16, at 122-23 (discussing adoption of panel reports).
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adoption of panel reports, the DSU has granted parties a right of
appeal to a newly-created standing appellate body.29
E. Composition of the Standing Appellate Body
The standing appellate body is comprised of seven members
who also serve in their individual capacity. The composition of the
standing appellate body was finally determined in late November
of 1995, after much debate over the geographic diversity of appel-
late body members. 30 Both the European Union and the United
States initially demanded that they have two members from each
of their respective territories. The United States finally agreed to
have only one member if Europe would agree to the same. The
European Union eventually acquiesced to this geographic allot-
ment only on an interim basis and intends to press for a new geo-
graphic allotment at the first WTO ministerial meeting in Singa-
pore in late 1996.31 With WTO dispute settlement cases already at
the panel stage, however, it was necessary to have the appellate
body32 operational by early 1996.
F. Process of the Appellate Body
Where a party notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal, consid-
eration of the adoption of a panel report is delayed until after the
appeal process has been concluded. Additionally, the appeal pro-
cess is governed by time deadlines, which generally require the
appellate body to issue a report within sixty days. While third
parties with a substantial interest in the disputed matter may
29 See Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Propo-
sal for Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment In-
dustry's Exports, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 563, 586 (1995) (comparing old GATT proce-
dure with new procedure under Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)); see also John
Weekes, Challenges Ahead: Emergency Direction for Trade and Agriculture, 18 HAmLnm L.
REv. 315, 315-17 (1995) (same).
30 See General Developments: GATT/ WTO Appellate Body's Seven Members Expected to
Begin Work in Early 1996, 12 Intl L. Rep. (BNA) No. 2018.
31 Id. (noting that "EU had considered panel's make-up geographically unfair").
32 Id. at 2018-22 (providing biographical notes on members of WTO Appellate Body). The
seven individuals chosen to the appellate body are the following: James Bacchus (United
States, former Congressman), Christopher Beeby (New Zealand, career diplomat), Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann (Germany, former EU Director-General of legal service and of competi-
tion for the European Commission), Said El-Naggar (Egypt, professor and international
posts with the UNCTAD and the World Bank), Florentino Feliciano (Philippines, Supreme
Court Justice), Julio Lacarte Muro (Uruguay, former ambassador and GATT official), and
Mitsuo Matsushita (Japan, professor). Id.
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submit their views to the panels, only parties to a dispute are
granted the right of appeal.3 3
Each appeal is heard by only three members of the standing
seven-member appellate body-based on a rotation system. Opin-
ions expressed in an appellate body report are anonymous,
although the names of the three members hearing the case remain
public. An appeal must be limited to the legal issues addressed
and legal interpretations developed in the panel report.3 4 The ap-
pellate body has broad authority to uphold, modify, or reverse a
panel's legal findings and conclusions. 5 Moreover, appellate body
reports are automatically adopted by the DSB within thirty days
unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. 6
G. Recommendations by Panels or the Appellate Body &
Remedies for Failure to Implement a Recommendation
In those cases where a panel or the appellate body concludes
that a Member's trade measure3 7 is inconsistent with a WTO
agreement, it must recommend that the offending party bring its
actions into conformity with the agreement:3 Accordingly, a panel
or the appellate body can suggest ways in which an offending
party could implement such a recommendation. In general, there
will be several options as to how to change a law to achieve legiti-
mate, non-protectionist policy objectives in a WTO-consistent
manner.
Compensation and suspension of concessions are available in
the event that an offending country does not implement the rec-
ommendations or rulings of a panel or appellate body "within a
reasonable period of time"-ordinarily fifteen months.3 9 The DSU
emphasizes that conformity with the relevant WTO agreement is
33 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 17(4), at 123 (discussing rights of appellate review).
34 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 17(6). "An appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered
in the panel report and legal interpretation developed by the panel." Id.
35 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 17 (13) (discussing procedures for appellate review); see
also Report of the Appellate Body, "United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline," AB-1996-1, at Part V ("The foregoing legal conclusions modify the conclu-
sions of the panel . . ").
36 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 17(14), at 124 (allowing for adoption of appellate reports).
37 The term trade measure includes any law, regulation, or practice of a nation.
38 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 19(1), at 124 (outlining scope of panel and appellate body
recommendations).
39 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22, at 126 (providing rules for governing compensation
and supervision of concessions).
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preferable to either compensation or suspension of concessions.40
For this reason, compensation or suspension of concessions are
considered to be "temporary" solutions only.4 Moreover, the DSB
will continue to monitor the implementation of a panel recommen-
dation even where compensation or retaliation has occurred. In
short, the spotlight will continue to shine on WTO agreement
violations.
Nonetheless, if within a "reasonable period of time" a Member
has not brought a trade measure into conformity with its obliga-
tions under a WTO agreement, compensation negotiations or sus-
pension of concessions may proceed.4 2 Compensation involves, for
example, the offending party agreeing to reduce a tariff on a good
of importance to the complaining party. Any compensation, how-
ever, must be on a most-favored-nation basis, making compensa-
tion negotiations difficult since any reduction in the tariff will ben-
efit all countries which export the good to the offending country.43
Consequently, the offending party will feel the need to identify, for
compensation negotiations, a product that it exclusively or largely
imports from the complaining party-typically a difficult task. If
compensation negotiations fail, then the complaining party can
proceed to request the DSB to authorize suspension of concessions
or other obligations.44
Suspension of concessions is often referred to as "retaliation," or
in general international law terminology as "countermeasures" or
"reprisal." It can entail the complaining party raising tariffs on a
good from the offending party. In essence, the DSB automatically
will approve a request for authorization to suspend concessions or
other obligations if the offending party continues to maintain a
measure inconsistent with a WTO agreement.45 Again, authoriza-
40 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(1) (noting that these are temporary measures in event
that recommendations and rulings are not implemented within reasonable time).
41 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(8), at 128. "The suspension of concessions or other
obligations shall be temporary." Id.
42 See Young, supra note 26, at 404-05. "If an aggrieved party does not think the offend-
ing party's compliance has been adequate or timely, it may require the offending party to
enter into negotiations 'with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.'" Id.
43 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 133-48; DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(1) (stating that
"[c]ompensation... shall be consistent with the covered agreements [including the MIN
obligation]").
44 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along With Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT, 88 AM. J. Ir'L L. 477, 486-87 (1994) (discussing suspension of concessions as
temporary solution if no agreement on compensation is reached within specified time).
45 See id. at 486-87.
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tion of suspension of concessions will result unless the DSB de-
cides by consensus not to authorize suspension of concessions.46
The level of suspension of concessions or other obligations au-
thorized by the DSB is equivalent to the extent of nullification or
impairment. 47 There is no punitive element to authorized retalia-
tion. Additionally, relief is only prospective, in that it provides for
lost future opportunities and not for opportunities lost prior to or
during the dispute settlement process. If a Member believes that
retaliation is disproportionate to the level of nullification or im-
pairment, the matter is decided by the original panel or an arbi-
trator appointed by the WTO Director-General. Arbitration rul-
ings regarding the level of retaliation are binding on both
disputing parties and will be approved by the DSB, unless it de-
cides by consensus not to authorize the retaliation.48
The DSU also specifies the type of retaliation a Member may
impose. Generally, a Member must retaliate within the same sec-
tor and under the same agreement involved in the dispute.
49 If
necessary for effective retaliation, the DSU does allow for "cross-
retaliation," that is, retaliation in other sectors or pursuant to an-
other agreement. 50 As with the level of retaliation, disputes over
the type of retaliation can be arbitrated.51
H. Exclusivity of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Article 23 of the DSU is titled "Strengthening of the Multilat-
eral System."52 It requires members to abide by the DSU when
seeking redress of a violation or other nullification or impairment
of benefits under WTO agreements.53 Pursuant to Article 23,
46 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(6), at 127-28 (describing circumstances where DSB will
authorize suspension of concessions).
47 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(4), at 127 (discussing level of suspension of
concessions).
48 See DSU, supra note 5, arts. 22(6) & 22(7), at 127-28 (discussing recommendation or
rulings).
49 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(3), at 126 (considering what concessions or other obli-
gations to suspend).
50 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(3)(c), at 127 (finding that where serious circumstances
exist, one may seek to suspend concessions under another covered agreement).
51 See DSU, supra note 5, art 22(6), at 127-28 (noting fumction and process of
arbitration).
52 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 23, at 128 (encouraging strengthening of multilateral
system).
53 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 23(1), at 128 (stating that "[w]hen Members seek the
redress of a violation ... they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures
of this Understanding").
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members are prohibited from unilaterally determining that a vio-
lation has occurred; they must resort to dispute resolution
through the DSU.54 This article also requires members to respect
the reasonable period of time given to an offending member to
bring its measure into conformity with a panel agreement. Fi-
nally, members must follow the DSU rules regarding the determi-
nation of the level of retaliation. 55
II. ENHANCED COMPLIANCE WITH WTO RULES: DOES THE NEW
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM FURTHER THIS
GOAL?
Several changes in the dispute settlement system, notably the
elimination of "blocking rights" 56 at various stages of the process
and the creation of an appeals process, indicate a shift toward a
more adjudicative or rule-oriented system.57 This shift in the
DSU's focus aims to increase compliance with WTO rules.58 The
issue of compliance has received increasing attention within the
international legal community in recent years, and the world trad-
ing system is no exception to this trend.5 9 The objective of enhanc-
ing compliance was to create a more stable and predictable trad-
ing system, and, thus, to maximize the potential welfare effects of
substantive rules liberalizing trade.6 ° Compliance became an even
54 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 23(2)(a), at 128-29 (noting that parties must rely on deter-
mination made by panel or appellate body).
55 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 23(2)(c), at 129 (stating that members must follow proce-
dures and rules of DSU to implement DSU determinations).
56 See Davey, supra note 13, at 94-98 (discussing how former system under GATT al-
lowed losing party to block consensus).
57 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONsTTUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw XLI-XLII (1991) (discussing need for shift
among countries in international trade law from "coexistence" to "integration" via "rule
oriented" legal process); see also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Rela-
tions Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 833 (1995)
(arguing rule-based adjudicative systems provide fairness, predictability, and stability for
all countries). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 83-97 (1989)
(discussing benefits of rule-oriented system).
5s See JACKSON, supra note 57, at 91-94 (discussing goals of GATT dispute settlement
procedures); see also Shell, supra note 57, at 849-53. The new system allows the WTO to
"engage in active surveillance of compliance measures" in order to ensure violations are
being remedied. Id. at 851.
59 See Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System
to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 409 (1995) (sug-
gesting joint ILO-GATT/WTO enforcement regime to promote compliance); see also Panel
Discussion, Compliance with International Standards: Environmental Case Studies, 89 Am.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 210-22 (1995).
60 See Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and the
Promise of Development, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1715, 1732 (1995) (encouraging developing
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more important issue with the adoption of the expanded and
strengthened rules contained in the WTO agreements. Before
considering whether the new DSU will achieve this goal, it is use-
ful to consider the performance of the old GATT dispute settle-
ment system.
A. Results Under the Old GATT System
Taken in context, the results under the old GATT system are a
surprising success story. Limited treaty provisions establishing
dispute settlement standards and procedures left the old GATT
dispute settlement system to evolve largely through practice. 6'
Prior to the entry into force of the WTO agreements and the DSU,
the GATT system had become the most widely used, multilateral
treaty-based dispute settlement system in the entire international
legal system.62 GATT's dispute settlement system, rarely used in
the 1960s and 1970s, became widely used in the 1980s and
1990s.13 For example, the number of cases handled by the GATT
countries to push for institutionalization of international trade agreements while seeking
economic growth).
61 See ROBERT HUDEC, THE JUDICIALIZATION OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, IN WHOSE
IrrEREST? DuE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 9 (M. Hart & D. Ste-
ger eds., 1990) (discussing gradual evolution of GATT dispute settlement into legalistic
process); see also Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement:
Moving Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAx & Bus. L. 38, 39-41 (1990) (discussing improvement
of GATT dispute settlement); Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism:
Its Present Situation and Its Prospects, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 5-6 (1993) (describing Article
XXIII as central article in GATT regarding dispute settlement); Frieder Roessler, Re-
marks, 85 Am. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 71-73 (1991); Shell, supra note 57, at 840-41 (noting
GATT's evolution from diplomatic into rule-oriented dispute settlement system); Young,
supra note 26, at 393-94 (labeling transformation into legal, adjudicatory dispute-resolu-
tion process "golden years of GAT"). See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAw OF GATT 163-92 (1969) (providing discussion of negotiating history of Article XX-
III and its early evolution).
62 See Jackson, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that GATT evolved dispute settlement system
is most extensive in world); see also Miguel M. Mora, A GATT With Teeth: Law Wins Over
Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103,
105 (1993) (noting that since end of World War II GATT dispute settlement mechanisms
have become most widely used dispute settlement methods for resolving disputes among
states).
63 See GAT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: A GUIDE To GATT LAw AND PRACTICE 731-34 (6th ed.
1994). The GAIT system handled 40 complaints from 1960-1980 and 114 cases from 1980-
89 under GATT Article XXIII and under Tokyo Round Non-Tariff Barrier Codes. Id.; see
also ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 375-83 (1993). The system
handled an additional 26 cases under GAT Article XXIII alone through March 1994. Id.
At least 140 cases, therefore, were handled in more than fourteen years.
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system over its last fifteen years far exceeded those handled by
the International Court of Justice during the same period.64
But was the old system successful in achieving compliance?
One study found that of 207 complaints filed between 1948-1990,
88 resulted in panel reports.65 Sixty-eight of the panel reports
found a rule violation.66 Forty-five of these decisions were imple-
mented to achieve full compliance with the relevant rule, while
fifteen additional decisions resulted in partial compliance.6 7 This
is certainly a better than modest record of achievement.
The picture, however, was not all rosy. Fifty-five of the 207
cases were either abandoned or withdrawn. 68 In at least nine of
these cases, and probably double this amount, the complaints
were withdrawn because the party believed that the GATT dis-
pute settlement was ineffective. 69 This circumstance raises an ad-
ditional question as to the number of valid complaints not even
pursued due to a belief that the system was ineffective. Moreover,
there was a drop-off in compliance or positive results in the
1980s.7° Some of the negative outcomes of the late 1980s could be
attributed to negotiating strategies in the Uruguay Round. It was
lack of compliance, however, that brought respect for the system
into question. Lastly, the statistical data does not account for the
importance of individual cases.71
Perhaps another factor in turning toward a more rule-oriented
approach was the fear that the previous success of the GATT dis-
64 See INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, YEARBOOK 1993-94 5-7 (1994). The Interna-
tional Court of Justice handled 25 contentious cases and six advisory cases for a total of 31
cases between 1980 and July 1994. Id.
65 See HUDEC, supra note 61, at 273-85 (providing detailed statistics of 207 GATT com-
plaints filed between 1948 and 1990).
66 See HUDEC, supra note 61, at 278 (concluding 77% of rulings (68 out of 88) found com-
plaint justified).
67 Id. at 278-79.
68 HUDEC, supra note 61, at 282.
69 Id. at 283-285; see also Lisa Sue Klaiman, Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Proce-
dures to a Trade Services Agreement: Proceed With Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 657,
661-67 (1990) (indicating that perception of GATT's dispute settlement procedure as inef-
fective led member countries to seek alternative solutions outside GATT in 1960s and early
1970s).
70 HUDEC, supra note 61, at 289-94 (noting significant decline in success rate during
1980s); see also Mora, supra note 62, at 152-53 (attributing recent problems with GATT
dispute settlement to noncompliance with recommendations or rulings of members).
71 See JACKSON, supra 57, at 101-03 (examining several important GATT trade dispute
cases); John F. Hall, International Law: The Year in Review, 84 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc.
130, 131 (1990) (reporting remarks of Frederic L. Kirgis, Professor of Law, Washington and
Lee University, discussing recent GATT panel decisions and stressing their importance in
ensuring strict enforcement of GAIT).
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pute settlement system would be further undermined if expecta-
tions of increased judicialization were not met.7 2 The notion seems
to be somewhat similar to the "bicycle theory"7" enunciated by
trade specialists with respect to substantive rules liberalizing
trade: move the dispute settlement system forward toward its goal
of achieving maximum compliance or watch the system fall.
B. Rule-Oriented Approach of the New WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding
The DSU represents the biggest leap in a gradual evolution
within the world trading system from a power-oriented approach
favoring diplomacy and politics to a rule-oriented approach favor-
ing adjudication and legal rules.74 It is important to realize, how-
ever, that the transformation has, in fact, been an evolution. It
was within the first full decade of GATT, during the 1950s, when
practice shifted to the use of panels comprised of individuals act-
ing in their individual capacities, in place of working groups,
where member governments were represented for purposes of
resolving disputes.7 5 The system prior to the Uruguay Round was
not a strictly power-oriented approach, and the new WTO system
is not a strictly rule-oriented approach. Diplomacy and politics
have not been removed from the system; rather, the relative
weight of adjudication and law vis-a-vis diplomacy and politics
has increased within the system.
It is useful to look at the current WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem along a continuum where one end is power-orientation and
72 See HUDEC, supra note 61, at 365 (noting legal development generated ambition for
further improvements). See generally PETERSmANN, supra note 57, at XLI (discussing need
for shift in international trade law to rule-oriented system).
73 See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 15 (1986) (identi-
fying bicycle theory phenomenon); see also Victoria C. Price, New Institutional Develop-
ments in GATT, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 103-04 (1992) (noting "bicycle theory" is
inherently unstable as it either progresses or collapses). See generally R. MICHAEL GADBAW,
MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980s: ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE GATr MINISTERIAL
MEETING OF 1982 36 (Seymour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1984) (developing
theme, later known as bicycle theory, that continued GATT negotiations were important to
maintain international trade agenda).
74 See Young, supra note 26, at 390-91 (finding that rule-oriented system will create
body of GATT jurisprudence that will increase compliance with GATT).
75 See Plank, supra note 16, at 54 (discussing historical background of dispute resolution
under GATT); see also Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and International Rela-
tions Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relations Perspective on the
U.S. /E.C. Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute, 19 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 1, 19
(1993) (noting shift to more legalistic approach to dispute settlement resulted from creation
of GATT panels in 1952).
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the other end is rule-orientation. The DSU does move the dispute
settlement system toward the rule-orientation end of the contin-
uum, but further steps in that direction are possible. For in-
stance, it is argued that international trade rules can serve "con-
stitutional functions" by limiting government action based on rule
of law and by protecting individual economic rights and free-
doms.7 6 To serve fully this function, private parties need access to
the international dispute settlement system and/or must be given
rights of action against governments in domestic law. Such a sys-
tem would render dispute resolution free from diplomacy and poli-
tics. There are certain complications with this approach, however,
and proposals along this line did not succeed in the Uruguay
Round negotiations.77 Moreover, it is questionable whether such
an approach would ultimately serve the end of increasing world
welfare. For example, governments may be less likely to enter
into substantive rules liberalizing trade under the aforementioned
enforcement mechanism. 78
Under the DSU, numerous stages of the panel process continue
to allow diplomacy and politics to operate. The first stage in any
dispute is consultations.79 Even after the panel process has begun,
negotiations between the parties may continue.80 Additionally,
the interim review stage has been criticized by some favoring the
rule-oriented approach as perhaps allowing a party the opportu-
nity to influence the panel in the midst of a rule determination. l
It is fair to conclude, however, that the emphasis on diplomacy
and politics has been reduced. The political "check" of "blocking"
the establishment of panels or the adoption of a panel report no
76 See PETERSMANN, supra note 57, at 288-89 (discussing possibilities of "constitutional-
izing" foreign trade law and policy).
77 See Matthew Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna-
tional Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions With Respect to Sub-Federal
Governments?, 17 Nw. J. Ir'L L. Bus. (forthcoming Feb. 1997); Todd S. Shenkin, Com-
ment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT:
Moving Toward a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 541, 585 (1994) (not-
ing denial of private parties to dispute resolution); see also Shell, supra note 57, at 896-97
(calling for need of commercial parties to be addressed in binding dispute resolution
system).
78 See JOHN JACKSON, WORLT TRADE AND LAW OF GATT 187-93 (1969); JOHN JACKSON, ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATioNAL ECONOMC RELATioNs 338 (1995).
79 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 4, at 1228 (enumerating guidelines for consultations).
8o See DSU, supra note 5, art. 4(5), at 1229 (encouraging settlement negotiations during
consultation process).
81 Pescatore, supra note 61, at 19.
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longer exists.82 Negotiations between the parties will have a
greater element of rule-orientation and a lesser element of raw
power as a result of this change. A challenging party is assured
that it can obtain a definitive determination on alleged rule viola-
tions. This assurance makes it more likely that the parties will
base negotiations on the expected determination of a panel. Addi-
tionally, the DSU explicitly requires that solutions reached be-
tween parties be consistent with covered agreements and de-
mands notification to the DSB of negotiated solutions, further
reducing the weight given to raw power.8 3 Thus, the heightened
intensity of rule-orientation in the system appears to enhance the
probability of compliance even with respect to negotiated
solutions.
Retaliation in response to a rule violation can also enhance com-
pliance with the rules.84 Under previous GATT practice, only once
had the Contracting Parties jointly authorized retaliation, and ul-
timately, the party authorized to retaliate chose not to do so.
8 5
The possibility of retaliation energizes export interests to join
with industrial import user and consumer interests to counteract
the protectionist interests of affected import-competing industries.
Retaliation can, therefore, facilitate the implementation of panel
reports by national parliaments.8 6 According to theories of public
82 See supra notes 59-62 (outlining changes in dispute settlement system).
83 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 3(b), at 1227 (setting forth general provisions to be fol-
lowed by members).
84 See Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 477, 487 (suggesting that closer legal system comes
to providing remedies for breaches, more effective and reliable it becomes); see also Shell,
supra note 57, at 851-52 (noting new WTO ability to enforce sanctions); Stiles, supra note 3,
at 28 (describing "highly credible threat" of retaliation as instrument of compliance). But
see Dillon, supra note 21, at 400 (questioning whether retaliation would be effective, partic-
ularly where complainant is developing country and defendant is wealthy developed
country).
85 Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8,
1952, in GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 31 (1952) (authorizing Netherlands to suspend con-
cessions against United States by imposing a limit on American wheat and flour imports).
Requests for retaliation were submitted in a few other cases but were not approved. The
GATT dispute settlement panel has authorized retaliation only once. See Roessler, supra
note 61, at 72 (noting single case of retaliation); see also Davey, supra note 13, at 57 (ac-
knowledging that retaliation has only been authorized once); Shell, supra note 57, at 832
(noting GATT dispute settlement panel has only authorized retaliation once in its entire
history); Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for
Sidestepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. INe'L L. 405, 424 (1994) (recognizing that retaliation
has only been authorized once).
86 See Lisa L. Bhansali, New Trends in International Dispute Settlement, 87 AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. Paoc. 2, 12 (1993) (indicating that retaliation was proposed as solution to problem
of implementation of panel reports); see also Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the
Rule of International Trade Law, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 56 (1994) (noting that retaliation
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choice, 7 retaliation may be a means to achieve compliance. Politi-
cians who may have gained votes or contributions from the pas-
sage of the initial protectionist legislation risk the loss of export-
related votes and contributions if retaliation follows a panel report
holding the legislation to be inconsistent with WTO obligations.
Indeed, theories of public choice do seem to be relevant in previ-
ous instances of threatened or actual unilateral retaliation. In-
stances exist where threatened or actual unilateral retaliation has
been targeted against industries within a geographic region repre-
sented by a politician who initiated the GATT-inconsistent mea-
sure. The European Community, for example, targeted products
largely produced in Texas in its threatened retaliation arising out
of United States Superfund legislation. The provision at issue im-
posed a tax of 8.2 cents per barrel on domestic crude oil received at
a U.S. refinery and a tax of 11.7 cents per barrel for petroleum
products entered into the United States for consumption, use or
warehousing. A GATT panel ruled (as was conceded by the
United States) that the tax violated the national treatment obliga-
tion of GATT. Senator Bentsen of Texas was seen as largely re-
sponsible for the legislation.8 Another example can be seen where
the United States targeted retaliation against beer brewed and
has been effective at ensuring compliance with panel reports); Mora, supra note 62, at 179
(suggesting that retaliation will provide United States and European Community with rea-
son to convince legislatures to amend legislation to comply with GATT); Roessler, supra
note 61, at 73 (positing that GAI1r dispute settlement procedures are successful because
they take into account real constraints of governments). But see William D. Hunter, WTO
Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, in COMMERCE DEPART-
MENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1994, at 547 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 863, 1990) (arguing "governments may decline to
implement adverse panel reports" if GATT-inconsistent measure more important than con-
sequences of retaliation).
87 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, 16 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 5, 18-21 (1996). The author states:
Public choice theory... posits that national and multilateral trade policies alike are
the result of interest group politics. National governments are viewed as politically
sophisticated actors, each pursuing self-interest agendas such as maximization of
votes, campaign contributions and the like. Well-organized and well-financed interest
groups will influence political outcomes successfully, while poorly organized or fi-
nanced interest groups will have little influence
Id.
88 United States: Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, Report of the
Panel, GATT Doc. [16175, June 17, 1987 GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136; see P.J.
Kuyper, The Law of GATT as a Special Field of International Law: Ignorance, Further
Refinement or Self-Contained System of International Law?, 25 NETHERLANDs Y.B. INT'L L.
227, 255 (1994) (observing European Community target of retaliation was Texas); see also
Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 459, 508-11 (1994) (discussing Superfund case).
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bottled in Ontario when that Canadian province refused to elimi-
nate discriminatory measures against U.S.-made beer.8 9
Although the change toward essentially automatic approval of
retaliation is likely to enhance compliance, it may not be as impor-
tant as labeling a Member a rule violator in a panel or appellate
body report. This may be particularly true in the case of the
United States and other economically powerful nations. Coun-
tries, including the United States, often find it difficult to craft
retaliation that harms neither domestic producers that import in-
puts nor those in the distribution chain, such as wholesalers and
retailers.90 Moreover, in cases where the United States is the rule
violator, other Members, particularly those with smaller econo-
mies, may be hesitant to retaliate. In addition, these aggrieved
parties may find it difficult to craft retaliation that has significant
impact on the United States.9 ' The new DSU did not go so far as
to create the possibility of collective sanctions by Members against
an offending Member, although such a measure would increase
the pressure for compliance caused by potential retaliation.92 Ad-
ditionally, the possibility of punitive damages or retroactive relief
might also increase the pressure for compliance. 93 Increased em-
89 In July, 1992, after winning a GATT panel decision, the United States imposed a 50%
duty on beer brewed and bottled in Ontario. See U.S., Canada Reach Agreement on Access
for U.S. Beer Sold In Ontario Markets, 10 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 1319 (Aug. 11, 1993)
(noting removal of duty on August 5, 1993).
90 See Judith H. Bello and Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 24:
Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits, 28
INT'L LAw. 1095, 1102 (1994) (discussing how new rules will affect United States as plaintiff
or defendant in GATT disputes); see also Dillon, supra note 21, at 385-85 (discussing dis-
pute settlement procedure and breaking down entire process into stages); David Silver-
stein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical Linkages and Implications for Global
Technological Competitivenes, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 318 n.219 (1991)
(noting President Bush's warning that protection hurts American consumers and exporters
because of higher prices and trade partner retaliation (quoting President Bush as ex-
pressed in BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLI-
cdEs 1990 3-4 in GIST: A REFERENCE: Am ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SEPT. 1990)).
91 See Davey, supra note 13, at 102 (finding that retaliation measures may have dispa-
rate effect on members).
92 See Timothy A. Glut, Note, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An Inter-
national Solution to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1241 (1995)
(arguing ideal countermeasure to violation of international law is collective sanctions in-
cluding trade boycotts); see also Kuyper, supra note 88, at 240-41 (looking at contracting
parties as shying away from these possibilities with GATI' dispute settlement); Jeong H.
Pires, North Korean Time Bomb: Can Sanctions Defuse It? A Review of International Eco-
nomic Sanctions as an Option, 24 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 307, 311 (1994) (noting idea of
collective sanctions has its origins in covenant of League of Nations).
93 DSU, supra note 5, art. 22(4), at 1240. The possibility of punitive damages clearly is
not allowed due to the DSU requirement that retaliation be equivalent to the level of nulli-
fication of impairment. Id.; see Kuyper, supra note 88, at 253-55. Kuyper included a discus-
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phasis on sanctions, however, could also have negative conse-
quences.9 4 For example, it would subject more private interests to
uncertainty as more trade flows are potentially subjected to in-
creased barriers.
Therefore, while the pressure of foreign retaliation is often
wanting for a large economy such as the United States, the label
of a rule violator does have real consequences, particularly for the
United States.95 If the United States does not live up to its obliga-
tions and take a leadership role in terms of compliance, then the
respect of other Members for the rules declines. This effect is evi-
dent when the United States develops and drafts implementing
legislation for trade agreements.96 Other countries carefully
watch how the United States implements the rules of trade agree-
ments, and "backsliding" by the United States causes other coun-
tries to follow its example. The status of a rule violator can also
hinder negotiation of further trade liberalization and thus can en-
ergize export, industrial import user, and consumer interests sup-
porting further liberalization.
C. Worries Over the New System
The major worries over the new DSU can be grouped into two
major categories: 7 1) that "wrong" cases will be brought;9 and 2)
sion of limited practice as well as legal argumentation under the GAT system. Id. It is
generally recognized that relief afforded can be only prospective. But see Amelia Porges,
Remarks, 88 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. Paoc. 10, 14 (1993). There have been two panels under the
Anti-Dumping Agreement that have recommended refund of back anti-dumping duties
paid. Id. These cases raised considerable controversy.
94 See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of
the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 751,
806 (1994) (indicating environmental trade sanctions could adversely impact international
trade system); Davey, supra note 13, at 103 (discussing negative consequences of sanc-
tions); Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment:
A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARv. ENvL. L. REv. 185, 225-26 (1994) (questioning value of
trade sanctions as sanctions reinforce negative perception of United States as bully); cf
Peter S. Watson, The Framework for the New Trade Agenda, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1237, 1247-48 (1994) (noting trade specialists' concern with using trade sanctions to en-
force environmental agreements).
95 See Davey, supra note 13, at 76 (using phrase "label as a rule violator"); cf Dillon,
supra note 21, at 400 (indicating that scholars have argued retaliation ineffective particu-
larly in cases where small, poor country is plaintiff and large, wealthy country is
respondent).
96 See, e.g., N. David Palmeter, Section 301: The Privatization of Retaliation, 3 TRANS-
NAT'L LAw. 101, 101-02 (1990) (suggesting that United States' implementing legislation for
trade agreements amounts to leadership role in complying with GATT).
97 See Davey, supra note 13, at 70. Professor Davey, while proposing reforms to the old
GATT system in the late 1980s, raised a third concern: that the move towards a more
adjudicative model with increased litigation would "poison the atmosphere" within the or-
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that the lack of political "checks" on the process will ultimately
lessen respect for the system.
1. Wrong Cases
The first type of "wrong" case that has been suggested is one in
which a WTO member has "unavoidably" violated a covered agree-
ment due to intense domestic political pressures. 99 This type of
"wrong" case is actually one which the DSU will handle better
than the old GATT system in terms of maximizing compliance. 00
Under the former GATT dispute settlement system, protectionist
pressure by import-competing domestic industry could force a gov-
ernment to "block" the process at various stages.10 By eliminating
the ability to "block" the process and creating a nearly automatic
right to retaliation in the event of a rule violation, the DSU makes
more tangible the effects of a rule violation on export interests,
thus intensifying their efforts to change the protectionist
legislation.
The second type of "wrong" case suggested is a dispute arising
out of a provision that is unclear or upon which there was no true
agreement as to its implications during negotiations. 1 2 It is ar-
ganization. Id. Each WTO member has now consented to a more adjudicative model, and
therefore it is unlikely that members will treat a resort to the new system as an affront.98 See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building A Pri-
vate-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. B. L. REv. 111, 119-20 (stating Tokyo Round
negotiators sought to prevent "wrong cases" from entering panel process); see also Ronald
A. Brand, GATT and the Evolution of United States Trade Law, 18 BRooK J. INT'L L. 101,
124 (1992) (indicating pragmatism and diplomacy are used to avoid bringing "wrong"
cases); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159-67 (1980) (describing "wrong cases" as those
which would threaten GATTs entire dispute settlement mechanism). See generally Marco
C.E.J. Bronckers, Private Response to Foreign Unfair Trade Practices-United States and
EEC Complaint Procedures, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 651, 695-700 (1984) (providing de-
tailed discussion of concept of "wrong cases").
99 See, e.g., Worldview GATT II: Panel to Settle U.S.-Venezuela Gasoline Dispute, Am.
POL. NETwoRK, Oct. 5, 1994, at 19 (noting United States' continued resistance to adopt
panel judgment that its embargo on imported tuna trapped in nets violates GATT); see
Hudec, supra note 98, at 159 (discussing that apparently, this concern had been raised
throughout evolution of dispute settlement system as it moved towards a more-rule ori-
ented approach and has further heightened in recent years. Id.
100 See Davey, supra note 13, at 73-74 (noting that rule-oriented system will lead to
greater compliance).
101 See supra notes 59-62 (discussing rule-oriented system under GAiTs dispute settle-
ment system).
102 See Hudec, supra note 98, at 160-63 (discussing various exceptions to GATT provi-
sions that weakened system); see also United States Action on Japan Trade, 141 CONG.
RE c. 86,433-01, S6,433 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) [hereinafter U.S. Action on Japan Trade]
(statement of former United States trade negotiator, Alan Wolff) (suspecting flaw in WTO
decision-making since rules do not cover Japanese automotive industry barriers).
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gued that venturing into these areas to make essentially legisla-
tive determinations are acts of judicial activism on the part of the
panels which will undermine the system.10 3 Though true, it is
probably less likely that panels will engage in judicial activism
under the DSU as compared to the old GATT system. The addi-
tional layers of review within the new system, including the in-
terim review process at the panel stage and the appeals stage it-
self, will likely serve as a check on instances of excessive judicial
activism. Moreover, panels are prohibited from increasing or di-
minishing the rights and obligations of the Members in the WTO
agreements. This prohibition seems to advise against judicial
activism.
2. Lack of Political "Checks" will Ultimately Undermine
Respect for the System
Despite complaints about "blocking" under the former GATT
system, that feature of the old system did ensure that there was
political support for the decisions of panels. Some argue that the
lack of political "checks" in the new process may mean that panel
and appellate body reports are adopted without adequate political
support and, thus, the process will be undermined. 10 4 The "block-
ing" right, however, was likely a greater threat to respect for the
dispute settlement system.
This concern, however, raises the question of what role the ap-
pellate body should and will play in the process. The body is given
broad powers to amend, modify, or reverse panel findings, but its
review is limited to legal issues. Of course, what constitutes a
legal issue is subject to some debate.'0 5 It has been suggested that
the appellate body exercise a certain measure of political acumen
as well.' 0 6 Any political check exercised by the appellate body
103 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, Stan-
dard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 212 (1996)
(noting that "panel should be cautious about adopting 'activist' postures in the GAT/WTO
context"); see also Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Green
Law or Green Spin? 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 14-15 (1994) (labeling GATT panel's
limitations on environmental exceptions "judicial activism" by panel).
104 See Shell, supra note 57, at 898 (discussing WTO's lack of politically accountable
system of checks and balances).
105 See Lowenfeld, supra note 44, at 483-84 (noting ambiguity in legal issues
terminology).




under the guise of a "legal" issue, however, would risk undermin-
ing respect for the system and the system's potential ability to en-
hance compliance in the "tough" cases.
III. UNITED STATES SOVEREIGNTY: DOES THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM CONSTITUTE A THREAT?
Unfortunately, rhetoric concerning sovereignty was raised to
such a level in the course of the Uruguay Round debate that real-
ity was blurred.10 7 The images found in large, full-page newspaper
ads were daunting. One ad featured a large GATT policeman shat-
tering the United States Capitol building with a sledge hammer' 018
and another showed the Declaration of Independence torn in two
pieces.
The debate over sovereignty has falsely promoted the notion
that our citizenship interests are being exchanged for our con-
sumer interests. 10 9 Indeed, published allegations stated that the
WTO would result in the exchange of our freedom and sovereignty
for new markets. 110 An alternative and more compelling explana-
tion is that the WTO dispute settlement system creates additional
pressures against special protectionist interests that violate both
our consumer and citizenship interests.
The word sovereignty has so many meanings that some interna-
tional scholars would prefer simply to discontinue its use."' It is
107 See 140 CoNG. REC. 15,271-03 (1994) (recording Sen. Robert Dole statement that "the
sovereignty issue is a red herring"); see also Documents Relating to the Clinton Administra-
tion's Agreement with Sen. Robert Dole Concerning the Uruguay Round Agreement, Issued
by the White House, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at D-76 (Nov. 23, 1994) (identifying
supporters of Uruguay Round not affecting sovereignty and those who alleged it would);
GATT: Clinton Urged to Delay GATT to Allow Further Consideration, 11 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 32, at D-6 (Aug. 10, 1994) (identifying proponents of delaying consideration of
Uruguay Round to resolve "ambiguities"); GATT: Helms Submits, Withdraws Measure Re-
quiring Vote on GATT as a Treaty, 11 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-5 (Aug. 10, 1994)
(conveying Professor Tribe's opinion that sovereignty is protected by Constitution); Stiles,
supra note 3, at 38 (discussing objectors to WTO based on sovereignty risks); Clayton
Yevetter, International Trade Agreements: Implication for Agriculture, 18 HAmLINs L. REV.
319, 323 (1995) (suggesting "sovereignty harangue" concerned compliance).
108 JEOPARDIZED BY GATT (advertisement), N.Y. TImEs, June 27, 1994, at A15.
109 See Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of Section
301, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1297, 1304 (1994) (acknowledging debate over whether
dispute settlement rules promote United States trade objectives or circumscribe
sovereignty).
110 See David M. Schwartz, WTO Dispute Resolution Panels: Failing to Protect Against
Conflicts of Interest, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 955, 966 n.81, 967 n.83 (referencing
proponents and opponents of dispute settlement system).
i11 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade Law,
20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 39, 39-40 (1994) (discussing varying interpretations of "sovereignty");
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difficult, however, to discard it altogether because the rhetoric in
trade agreement debates is often couched in terms of sovereignty.
An examination of two of its most commonly used definitions is
useful in the context of the dispute settlement system.
A. Holder of Supreme Power
The first definition of "sovereignty" refers to the holder of
supreme power over a specific subject matter.1 12 The United
States government retains the supreme power over all elements of
United States trade law and policy as well as other matters ad-
dressed by the Uruguay Round agreements. The President may,
with the approval of Congress, enter into international trade
agreements consistent with the U.S. Constitution. 113 Entering
into the Uruguay Round agreements and the new WTO dispute
settlement system was an exercise of this constitutional authority
and of United States sovereignty. The United States has given up
its ability to enact legislation inconsistent with the WTO rules
without violating its international obligations, however, all trea-
ties necessarily give up "sovereignty" in this respect. The United
States is also subject to WTO dispute settlement complaints by
other members. However, WTO dispute settlement panel reports
or appellate body reports are not self-executing and do not change
United States law. 114 Congressional action, in concert with or over
the veto of the President, remains the exclusive avenue to change
United States law. In this respect, WTO panel reports must be
distinguished from bi-national panels under Chapter 19 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Much concern
has been expressed over bi-national panels supplanting judicial
Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSLETTER, Mar.-May
1993, at 1.
112 See BLAci's LAw DIcToNARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
113 See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV.
799, 929 n.500 (1995) (referencing memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger to U.S. Trade Reporter Michael Kantor dated July 29, 1994); see also John H.
Jackson, GATT and the Treaty Debate, J. COM., Aug. 16, 1994, at 8A (contending that
GATT agreement approval as Congressional Executive Agreement is consistent with con-
stitutional practice and precedent).
114 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994) (stating that
"United States law to prevail in conflict"); STATEMENT OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTs AcT, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1032 (1994)
(statement of Representative Sam Gibbons of Florida, Acting Chairman, House Comm. on




review of United States agency determinations in antidumping
and countervailing duty cases.115 NAFTA Chapter 19 bi-national
panels apply United States law116 and their decisions are virtually
self-executing. 7 Criticisms of this system are not appropriately
directed at the WTO dispute settlement system or the general dis-
pute settlement process of NAFTA under Chapter 20.
Thus, where the United States is faced with a WTO dispute set-
tlement panel report recommending a change in a law inconsis-
tent with WTO, Congress would have to enact new legislation to
implement the recommendation. Of course, it might also be possi-
ble in some circumstances for the United States Executive Branch
to implement a panel report through a regulation. While it is true
that the United States may face retaliation (suspension of conces-
sions) for maintaining a WTO-inconsistent law, the WTO dispute
settlement system allows the United States to have the level of
retaliation itself reviewed by a panel of arbitrators. It is impor-
tant to remember that in the absence of WTO agreements or other
treaty obligations, the lack of customary international law relat-
ing to international trade would allow a foreign trading partner to
"retaliate" if it did not like a certain U.S. law. Moreover, this "re-
taliation" would not be reviewed by an arbitral body. Of course,
the United States has a national interest in effective international
trade rules, and therefore, should not exercise its option to ignore
a WTO dispute settlement panel or appellate body report and
maintain WTO-inconsistent legislation absent some fundamental
flaw in the dispute settlement process or determination. In gen-
eral, the pressure of being labeled a rule violator and/or retalia-
tion does not interfere with our citizenship interests. Instead,
such pressure promotes our citizenship interests along with our
115 See Dole, Finance Committee Members Warn Against NAFTA Panel System, 13 IN-
SIDE U.S. TRADE 1 (1995).
116 See National Council for Ind. Defense v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 794, 796-97
(D.C. 1993) (discussing legislative history and implementation of Chapter 19); see also
North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 605, 682-83 (1993) (outlining appropriate
application of laws).
117 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(aXgX7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (outlining implementation of
international obligations under article 1904); see also Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh,
NAFTA Binational Panel Review: Should it be Continued, Eliminated or Substantially
Changed?, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529, 547-48 (1995) (explaining effect of 19 U.S.C. § 1516
(gX7)); Patricia Kelmar, Binational Panels of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment in Action: The Constitutional Challenge Continues, 27 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
173, 181 (1993) (discussing judicial review and presidential acceptance of panel findings in
"fall-back provision").
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consumer interests by helping counteract special interest legisla-
tion with a protectionist motivation or design.
B. Independence From Other Nations
Another common definition of sovereignty focuses on a nation's
independence from other governments or non-subordination to an
external authority.118 In some ways, the growing interdependence
of economies, rather than any aspect of international economic
law, has lessened the independence of nations from actions of
other governments. The United States economy, for example, is
affected by interest rates in Europe, savings rates in Japan, and
growth rates in Asia and South America.
Conventional international law or "treaty" law, recognizes the
sovereignty or autonomy of nations because it is based on a na-
tion's consent to become bound. Although the consent basis of in-
ternational law is not absolute, it remains a cornerstone of inter-
national trade law which is treaty based. When the United States
enters into an international trade agreement, it does so consensu-
ally as an exercise of its sovereignty. By entering the WTO, the
United States has agreed, in the absence of a negative consensus,
to allow the establishment of dispute settlement panels under the
WTO, to allow dispute settlement panel reports or appellate body
reports to become binding international obligations, and to have
countermeasures authorized in cases of non-implementation of a
panel report. This does not, however, mean that the United
States is subordinated to the WTO because the WTO panels can-
not change United States law.
WTO institutional rules outside dispute settlement also protect
U.S. sovereignty. Any amendment to a WTO agreement that
would apply to the United States requires the United States to
consent to the amendment, with the exception of those that are
truly procedural and would not affect the substantive rights or ob-
ligations of the United States. 119 Indeed, the WTO protects United
States sovereignty in this regard to a greater degree than its pred-
118 BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990); see W.L. Hayhurst, When Sovereignties
Collide-Sovereignties and the Regulation of Business in Relation to Intellectual Property:
A Canadian Perspective, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 195, 195 (1994) (quoting Rt. Hon. Joe Clark
stating "that is the essence of sovereignty - being able to do as we want to do").
119 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round, art. X, at 1125, 1149 (1994) (stating that "formal acceptance
process" is necessary for amendment to WTO agreements).
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ecessor, the GATT, the de facto institution of the world trading
system for the past fifty years. 120 Ironically, some interests have
complained that no "democratic fix" to adjudicative errors exist
within the WTO because of its difficult amendment and interpre-
tation rules. 12 1 The critical point is that a "democratic fix" always
lies in Congress, which can refuse to implement a panel report
where the process is fundamentally flawed.
With this understanding of the United States Constitution and
of international law, it is hard to argue that national sovereignty
is somehow compromised by the federal government's agreement
to the WTO dispute settlement system. Nevertheless, several cri-
tiques founded in sovereignty rhetoric must be addressed.
Critique #1: "Faceless" bureaucrats can determine that the
United States is a rule violator and can ultimately impose trade
sanctions against the United States. 122
Although dispute settlement panels are generally comprised of
both governmental and non-governmental individuals, one reason
why they remain "faceless" is that citizens of a country that is
party to a dispute cannot serve on a panel. While this rule makes
sense with respect to government officials due to the potential con-
flict of interest, it may be an unnecessary prohibition with respect
to private individuals. As one previous panel member noted, the
rule effectively prohibits the most renowned United States non-
governmental individuals from serving on most panels because
the United States is a party in many dispute settlement cases. 123
Nevertheless, recent experience with NAFTA bi-national panels,
which use primarily non-governmental individuals, indicates that
caution should be exercised in changing the flat prohibition. Sev-
eral high profile bi-national panels have split along nationality
lines; in some cases with strong allegations of panelists serving
120 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that "protections for national sovereignty
built into the WTO Charter rules on decision making are substantially enhanced"); see also
Hearing on Uruguay Round Agreement, World Trade Organization and U.S. Sovereignty,
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 857-58 (1994) (state-
ment of John H. Jackson) (noting increased protections of United States' sovereignty under
WTO).
121 See U.S. Action on Japan Trade, supra note 102, at S6,433 (statement of Alan Wolff)
(questioning proposals for automatically binding system).
122 See, e.g., Sabotage, ROLL CALL, May 18, 1992, at 18 (indicating advertisements by
various groups).
123 See Pescatore, supra note 61, at 8 (explaining role of citizenship in panel selections).
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despite conflicts of interest.1 2 4 This led one scholar to propose an
amendment to Article 19 of NAFTA under which bi-national panel
opinions would not be issued when the opinions split along nation-
ality lines. 12
5
The existence of a standing appellate body under the WTO dis-
pute settlement system will likely remove some of the allegations
of "facelessness." Since it is argued that appeals within the sys-
tem may be frequent, it is likely these individuals will not remain
"faceless."
An additional question can be raised as to whether the United
States would prefer a self-judging system where a particular coun-
try's Minister of Foreign Trade would judge United States laws.
Some would respond that a power-oriented system focusing on
self-judgment and negotiations is the ideal system for the United
States, due to United States power within the system.
Critique #2: As the country with the greatest power in the system,
the United States should seek a power-oriented system rather than
a rule-oriented system. 126
The issue raised by this critique is whether the shift to a more
rule-oriented system is beneficial even to the most powerful coun-
try. It is generally recognized that a rule-oriented system is far
better for countries with small economies than is a power-oriented
approach. However, both the legislative and executive branches of
the United States government agreed American interests would
be best served by a more rule-oriented approach in the Uruguay
Round.12 7 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
stated that a more effective and expeditious dispute settlemnt sys-
124 See In Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, No. ECC-94-1904-
01USA, 1994 WL 405928, at *45 (NAFTA Binat'l Panel 1994) (Aug. 3, 1994) (Wilkey, J.,
dissenting); see also Charles M. Gastle & Jean G. Castel, Should the North American Free
Trade dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases be
Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber III?, 26 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 823, 823-25
(1995) (noting challenges to committee reports based on members' bias). See generally
Michael Diehl & Homer E. Moyer, Jr., NAFTA Brings Binational Panels to the Fore, 7
MExico TRADE & L. REP. 12 (1994) (discussing nationality factor in Softwood Lumber).
125 See Chapter 19 Proposal Sparks Interest From U.S. Officials, Cable Says, 2 INsIDE
NAFTA 7 (Nov. 1, 1995).
126 See, e.g., U.S. Action on Japan Trade, supra note 102, at S6,433 (statement of Alan
Wolff) (noting advantage of power-oriented system for United States).
127 See Ronald A. Brand, Competing Philosophies of GATT Dispute Resolution in the Oil-
seeds Case and the Draft Understanding on Dispute Resolution, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 117,




tem was a negotiating goal of the United States efduring the Uru-
guay Round. 12
8
Under the old GATT system, the United States was a plaintiff
more than any other country and often was involved in disputes
with other powerful members such as the European Union and
Japan. 129 Nonetheless, there has been considerable second-guess-
ing as to whether this rule-oriented approach is desirable, particu-
larly in light of the fact that the United States has been a defend-
ant nearly as much as a plaintiff in recent years.
International trade rules ultimately are established to increase
national and world welfare through more efficient use of re-
sources. It seems unlikely that a more power-oriented approach
would raise national or world welfare. The threat of trade wars,
damaging to United States and world welfare, would grow, partic-
ularly since many United States disputes are with other powerful
WTO members. A power-oriented system would reduce the pre-
dictability and stability required by private enterprise and some
allocation of resources would likely be distorted as a result. More-
over, United States power might be exercised for special interests
and protectionist purposes. Indeed, when the United States
"loses" a WTO dispute settlement case, will it necessarily mean
that the United States has lost? In general, the WTO agreements
do not prohibit Members from pursuing legitimate objectives. The
rules generally, although not always, prohibit the pursuit of pro-
tectionist objectives or of legitimate objectives through protection-
ist means. To the extent that a majority of WTO cases are decided
128 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1101(b)(1), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2901(b)(1) (1994). Section 2901(b)(1) states:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to dispute settle-
ment are-
(A) to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute settlement mechanisms and
procedures; and
(B) to ensure that such mechanisms within the GATT and GAIT agreements provide
for more effective and expeditious resolution of disputes and enable better enforcement
of United States rights.
Id.; see also Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of Section
301, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1297, 1304 (1994) (discussing sovereignty of United States'
through limitation of bilateral or unilateral action).
129 See Jackson, supra 57, at 100 (stating that of 77 cases involving United States either
as plaintiff or defendant between 1980-89, in 40 of those cases opposing party was either
European Community or Japan); see also HUDEC, supra note 61, at 597-08 (indicating that
in many other disputes other party involved was current member of expanded European
Union, such as Sweden and Finland).
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on this basis, 130 it is quite possible that U.S. citizenship and con-
sumer interests, as well as national welfare, will have "won" in
many instances in which the U.S. government loses a WTO case.
In addition to reducing the importance of power within the in-
ternational system, the new system also faces allegations that it
will diminish the ability of the United States to use its power
unilaterally.
Critique #3: The United States' ability to use unilateral "unfair"
trade remedies has been or could be diminished by the WTO dis-
pute settlement system. 131
One reason for the second-guessing of the new dispute settle-
ment system is that other countries agreed to it.1 32 Those opposed
to the new system inferred that participating countries must have
gained some advantage over the United States in order for them
to agree to the system. Such an implication harkens back to the
mercantilist view of trade. 13 3 Such an inference fails to recognize
that the mutual advantage of trade liberalization also can be fur-
thered by enforcement mechanisms that ensure maximum compli-
ance with the welfare-enhancing rules. Other countries did note
the limits that the new system placed on United States unilateral
remedies. Concerns within the United States focused on Section
301 which has been used successfully to open foreign markets.
Antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which allow addi-
tional duties to be placed on "unfair" imports, also have received
considerable attention. The key question is whether the DSU les-
sens the ability of the United States to enforce its rights under
trade agreements effectively or to respond to "unfair" imports. If
so, is the lessening of this ability in our national interest?
130 See Roessler, supra note 61, at 73 (stating that "[it is therefore rare that a measure
complained against in the GATT serves legitimate noneconomic policy goals").
131 See Hearing on WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act, Before the Senate
Fin. Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. D 576 (1995) (statements of George Scalise, Chairman,
Semiconductor Ind. Ass'n and Curtis H. Barnette, Chairman, Bethlehem Steel Corp.) (dis-
cussing advantage of use of unilateral trade remedies).
132 See id. (noting ready acceptance of other member countries).
133 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Rise and Fall of the Classical Corporation, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1677, 1680 (1992) (defining "mercantilist ideology"). See generally Deborah A. Ballam,
The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship in the United States: Colonial





The WTO dispute settlement process is the exclusive means for
pursuing remedies for WTO agreement violations. Members can-
not make unilateral determinations of rule violations.1 3 4 Article
23 of the DSU evinces an intent that, at least for purposes of dis-
pute settlement, the GATT is a "self-contained" system. 135 Thus,
customary, international law principles, which might have al-
lowed for countermeasures while a nation proceeded to arbitra-
tion, no longer apply. 13
6
Section 301 allows the United States to initiate on its own ac-
cord or on the basis of a private petition an investigation of foreign
trade practices that violate a WTO or other trade agreement, or
are unreasonable and burdensome to United States commerce. 137
Generally, Section 301 investigations deal with practices inhib-
iting U.S. exports.138 As it did prior to the Uruguay Round, Sec-
tion 301 continues to allow the United States Trade Representa-
tive ("USTR") to utilize the international dispute settlement
system before making a determination regarding a foreign trade
practice under investigation. Moreover, the section does not man-
date that the USTR take unilateral action against a foreign trade
practice if a dispute settlement panel finds that the practice is in-
consistent with WTO agreements. Thus, Section 301 can be used
consistently with the new WTO dispute settlement rules. Of
course, the USTR could use Section 301 in a manner inconsistent
with WTO rules, including Article 23 of the DSU. Thus, the actual
powers granted to the USTR by Congress have not been dimin-
ished.139 If the USTR chooses to exercise the granted authority in
134 See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(gXl) (1994) (delineating "[requirements for agency action");
Timothy A. Harr, WTO Dispute Settlement Provisions, in THE GATT, Tm WTO AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS AcT, at 579 (PLI Comm. Litig. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 722, 1995) (discussing procedural requirements of DSU).
135 See Kuyper, supra note 88, at 252. Kuyper explains that it is too early to determine
that the WTO has moved decisively toward self-contained system, despite its intention to
do so. Id. The WTO system, however, is not self-contained in another sense. The DSU
explicitly adopts customary international law rules of interpretation for panels. See DSU,
supra note 5, art. 3(2), at 115.
136 See Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement Between France and the United
States, Arbitral Award of Dec. 9, 1978, 18 U.N.R.I.AA. 417, 443-46. See generally Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration or Both, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. PRoc. 785 (1980)
(recognizing detailed procedures and rules for dispute resolution).
137 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988).
138 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 107.
139 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 128, at 1307 (noting that United States retains au-
thority to disregard certain obligations when warranted in national interest).
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such a manner, respect for the new WTO dispute settlement sys-
tem will be diminished, and the United States will be labeled an
international rule violator.
In some senses, however, the new dispute settlement system in-
ternationalizes Section 301 because it ensures an expeditious de-
termination regarding the consistency of a foreign country's prac-
tice with WTO agreements. In cases where a dispute settlement
panel or the appellate body determines that the practice has vio-
lated a WTO agreement, the DSB will authorize retaliation auto-
matically. Section 301 gives the USTR authority under United
States law to take such retaliatory action. The timing, type, and
size of retaliation otherwise chosen might be affected by the new
DSU. Again, however, the USTR will have the statutory power to
ignore the international rules regarding retaliation.
In short, the WTO system allows for expeditious, effective en-
forcement of United States rights, which arguably could be en-
sured under Section 301 only by unilateral action due to defects in
the old GATT dispute settlement system and the limited scope of
substantive obligations under GATT. 140 The new WTO dispute
settlement system, together with aggressive monitoring, will en-
sure that Section 301 remains an effective tool for opening foreign
markets. 141
b. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Remedies
The WTO agreements-specifically, the GATT 1994, the An-
tidumping Agreement, and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures-allow a Member to place an additional
duty even beyond bound tariff rates on dumped and subsidized
imports if such imports are causing material injury to an industry
within the Member's territory. These duties are equal to the mar-
gin of dumping or the rate of subsidization, respectively. For
many years, the United States was the primary user of antidump-
ing and countervailing duty laws. In recent years, however, many
140 See Brand, supra note 127, at 138. "lilt seems the United States can probably with-
stand a reduction in the availability of [unilateral] Section 301 sanctions when accompa-
nied by a substantially increased likelihood that sanctions authorization will come from the
GATT itself." Id.
141 See THoMAs 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY A. ELLIOT, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S.
TRADE POLICY 3 (1994). "[O]ur principal policy recommendation is that the United States
move from aggressive unilateralism to aggressive multilateralism, using the improved dis-
pute settlement mechanism to enforce WTO rules." Id.
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other countries have begun to employ these "unfair" trade reme-
dies, particularly antidumping laws. 4 2 In the past, there was a
domestic constituency in favor of antidumping laws that could
overcome the interests opposed to such laws. Industrial import
users are not always affected tangibly, and consumer interests are
often diffuse and subject to transaction costs in assembling a coali-
tion. As a result of the increased use of antidumping laws by de-
veloping countries, however, the United States now has a new do-
mestic constituency that is opposed to antidumping laws, or at the
very least protectionist abuse of such laws, namely United States
exporters.
The Uruguay Round negotiations hosted a fierce debate over a
revised antidumping agreement.143 Additionally, provisions of the
United States implementing bill that amended existing an-
tidumpting law also proved to be quite controversial. The Uru-
guay Round Antidumping Agreement contains more stringent
rules regarding national antidumping investigation procedures
and slightly more stringent substantive rules.144 However, any
changes to the Agreement, making United States imposition of
antidumping duties more difficult, can be seen as necessary to pro-
tect overall United States interests in light of the current dynam-
ics regarding use of antidumping laws. In fact, further limitations
on the use of antidumping laws may be necessary to protect over-
all United States interests.145 In any event, neither export inter-
ests nor import-competing interests were satisfied with the final
results.
The controversy over the substantive and procedural rules in-
cluded an interesting provision found in the Antidumping Agree-
ment which addresses the standard of review for a dispute settle-
ment panel in judging actions of national authorities. 46 Article
142 See Cynthia Beltz, Investors Make Lousy Crowbars, J. COM., May 25, 1995, at 10A
(noting that over 40 nations, including developing countries, have adopted antidumping
laws).
143 See JACKSON, ET AL, supra note 9, at 685; see also JEFFREY J. SCHOTr & JOHANNA W.
BuuRmAN, Tim URUGUAY ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT 84 (1994).
144 See JACKSON, ET AL, supra note 9, at 685.
145 See, e.g., Gary N. Horlick, How the GATT Became Protectionist: An Analysis of the
Uruguay Round Final Antidumping Code, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 5, 1993, at 5, 6-7 (sug-
gesting antidumping laws actually injure American interests).
146 See David Palmeter & Gregory J. Spak, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Disputes: Defining GA7Ts Role in an Area of Increasing Conflict, 24 LAw. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1145, 1156-58 (1993) (explaining applicable standard of review for GATT Panels
and posing interesting debate on this issue); see also James R. Cannon, Jr. & Karen L.
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17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement specifies various standards of
review to be utilized by the panels. 147 Specifically, Article 17.6 of
the Antidumping Agreement requires panels to abide by the fol-
lowing standards of review:
i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall
determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts
was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was
unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion,
the evaluation shall not be overturned;
ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the
Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpreta-
tion of public international law. Where the panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one
permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authori-
ties measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests
upon one of those permissible interpretations.
The motivation behind Article 17.6 was to ensure that panelists
give a certain level of deference to the factual findings and evalua-
tions of national authorities as well as to the legal implementation
of the Antidumping Agreement by national governments. While
the provision received strong support from "protectionist an-
tidumping lobbies,"148 it is unclear just how much deference will
be accorded by virtue of clause (ii) with respect to issues of law. It
seems that application of customary international law rules of in-
terpretation will not lead to several permissible interpretations of
provisions of the agreement very often, if ever.
Bland, GAT? Panels Need Restraining Principles, 24 LAw. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1167, 1172-
75 (1993) (describing "interpretive disputes" in applying standard of review); Timothy M.
Reif, Coming of Age in Geneva: Guiding the GATT Dispute Settlement System on Review of
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 24 LAw. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1185,
1189-93 (1993) (suggesting standard of review used in administrative law proceedings
should be applied by GATT panels). See generally Croley & Jackson, supra note 103, at 193-
213 (arguing that justification for Chevron-like deference to national authorities carries
little weight in international arena but that deference may be supportable on other
grounds).
147 See generally William D. Hunter, WTO Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Cases, in THE COMMERCE DEP'T SPEAKS ON INT'L TRADE AND INvEsT-
MENT 1994, at 547 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 863, 1994) (de-
tailing genesis and effect of Article 17.6).
148 See Petersmann, supra note 5, at 1235 (describing support groups that lobbied for
Antidumping Agreement Article 17.6).
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Under customary international law, the text of a provision, tak-
ing into account the context and the purpose of the agreement, is
to be the primary means of interpretation. 4 9 Where the text
leaves the meaning ambiguous, a panel can refer to preparatory
work of the Uruguay Round and the circumstances surrounding
its conclusion.150 Only if the meaning remains ambiguous after
reference to these supplementary sources would more than one
permissible interpretation exist.'5 1 Thus, it is unclear exactly how
much deference a panel will ultimately grant to national authori-
ties, at least with respect to legal issues. 152
The likelihood that panel deference to national governments
will not be as great in legal implementation vis-a-vis factual mat-
ters has a sound policy basis.-5 3 Too much discretion granted by
panels to national authorities could lead to divergent implementa-
tion of the agreement by WTO members. If a lowest common de-
nominator phenomenon occurs toward a protectionist bias in the
implementation of antidumping laws, then the effectiveness of
GATT rules in liberalizing trade will be weakened. As a result,
United States industrial import users and exporters, as well as
consumer interests, would suffer.
IV. THE DOLE BILL AND NATIONAL REvIEw OF WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT REPORTS
In late November 1995, Senator Robert Dole introduced the lat-
est version of a bill to create a WTO dispute settlement review
commission in the United States Senate.15 4 The bill's provisions
149 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-692
(1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention's rules on treaty interpre-
tation are recognized as codifying customary international law. Id.; see also Jeffrey Rabkin,
Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 2120, 2124 n.18 (1995) (explaining customary international law and Vienna
Convention).
150 See Vienna Convention, supra note 149, art. 32, at 692 (following traditional themes
under international law).
151 President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uruguay
Round Agreement, Dec. 15, 1993, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Dec. 17, 1993, at 2154(discussing multiple permissible interpretations acknowledged by standard of review).
152 See id. (stating only that "principal negotiating objectives" were achieved).
153 See Measure Read the First Time - S. 1438, 141 CoNG. REC. S17,875-04 (1995) (in-
troducing Sen. Robert Dole's dispute settlement bill); see also Hearings on S.1438 Before
the Senate Finance Comm. 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan William Wolff)
(asserting that "protectionism" will not lead to implementation of desired policies).
154 S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see Measure Read the First Time -S. 1438, 141
CONG. REC. S17875-04 (1995) (introducing dispute settlement bill).
19961
342 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
with respect to the review commission closely resemble those in
an earlier version of the bill, 155 despite suggestions in the interim
to constitute the commission in a different manner or to establish
an additional commission. 156 While many thought the bill would
be forgotten with Senator Dole's retirement from the Senate, other
senators have continued to press for its passage. 157 The provi-
sions of the latest Dole bill proposing to establish a national re-
view commission are analyzed below.
A. The National WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
as Proposed by the Dole Bill
The commission to be established by the Dole Bill would be com-
prised of five federal circuit court judges.15 These judges would be
required to examine panel or appellate body reports adopted by
the DSB, decided adverse to the United States, where the United
States is a defendant. 159 Only upon a request of the United States
Trade Representative will the review commission examine reports
adverse to the United States in which the United States is a
plaintiff.160
The review commission's scope of review, however, is limited to
determining whether the panel or appellate body has:
1) demonstrably exceeded its authority or its terms of
reference;
2) added to the obligations, or diminished the rights, of the
United States under the Uruguay Round agreement which is
the subject of the report;
3) acted arbitrarily or capriciously, engaged in misconduct, or
demonstrably departed from the procedures specified for
panels or the appellate body in the applicable Uruguay Round
agreement; and
155 See Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Dole Places WTO legislation on Senate Calendar for this
Year, Int.l Trade Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) (Dec. 12, 1995) at D37 (discussing earlier
abandoned bill).
156 S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7 & 16 (1995). Provisions regarding private party
participation and involvement in United States dispute settlement cases were significantly
changed. Id.
157 See Hollings Block Attempt by Grassley to Pass WTO Review Bill, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
July 5, 1996, at 22.
158 S.1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess § 3(b)(1) (1995).




4) deviated from the applicable standard of review, including
in antidumping cases, the standard of review set forth in Arti-
cle 17.6 of the [Antidumping] Agreement .... 161
The review commission is to make an affirmative determination
regarding the report if it finds any of the matters listed in the stat-
utory criteria above, and the action materially affected the out-
come of the report. 162 One affirmative determination can lead to a
congressional resolution calling upon the President to undertake
negotiations to amend or modify the matter relating to the re-
port. 163 Three affirmative determinations within a five-year period
can lead to a congressional resolution withdrawing Congress' ap-
proval of the Uruguay Round agreements. 164
B. In the Name of Sovereignty?
The fact that the commission automatically reviews adverse de-
cisions involving a complaint about a United States measure,
while adverse reports in which the United States is a complaining
party are reviewed by the commission only upon a request of the
United States Trade Representative, might seem somewhat curi-
ous. Why is impartial review of complaints involving the interests
of United States companies that export seemingly less important
than complaints involving U.S. laws? The difference in treatment
does provide an indication that one motivation is a perceived
threat to United States sovereignty. 165
As discussed above, one of the sovereignty clothed critiques of
the DSU system extends to the possible constraints on the use of
United States unfair trade laws, particularly antidumping
laws. 166 Indeed, the Dole Bill declares a congressional "under-
standing that effective trade remedies would not be eroded" by the
Uruguay Round agreements.1 67 Again, the Uruguay Round An-
tidumping Agreement and the development of the United States
161 Id. § 4(a)(2).
162 Id. § 4(a)(3).
163 S.1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(1), (bXl) (1995).
164 Id. § 6(a)(2), (b)(2).
165 141 CONG. REC. S.16,695 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1995). Senator Dole himself has described
the legislation as "an insurance policy for our sovereignty." Id.
166 See, e.g., Documents Relating to the Agreement Between the Clinton Administration
and Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan) Concerning the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1865 (Nov. 23, 1994) (describing sovereignty issues as impetus
for Dole Bill).
167 S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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implementing legislation of the agreement were hotly con-
tested. 168 The debate over aspects of the Dole Bill is in part a con-
tinuation of this struggle. The commission's scope of review in-
cludes the ability to determine whether the applicable standard of
review in antidumping cases has been followed by a panel. 169 Pro-
ponents of antidumping laws hope that the establishment of the
commission will unduly pressure panels to give broader deference
to determinations made by United States authorities in an-
tidumping cases. 1 70 In other words, proponents hope that the com-
mission will force panels to give an unfairly broad reading to Arti-
cle 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement.' 71 If this is the function
the review commission ultimately serves, then its establishment
will not be in the name of sovereignty but in the name of
protectionism.
On a positive side, however, the review commission may help to
eliminate the perception that United States sovereignty is some-
how infringed upon by the DSU. 172 United States participation in
the WTO system is essential to that system's ability to govern
world trade effectively. Critical to United States participation is
the support of the American people. Thus, the possibility that the
review commission will add to the system's credibility in the eyes
of the American public is an important consideration. But is this
reason enough to establish the commission, when other options 173
might exist to eliminate perceived sovereignty concerns? Even if
this reason is compelling, what impact will the commission have
on compliance with WTO rules?
168 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 140 CONG. REC. S15,151 (daily ed. Nov. 30,
1994) (considering proposed antidumping legislation).
169 See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text (discussing commission role in re-
viewing panel decisions).
170 See, e.g., World Trade Organization Oversight: 1995 Hearings on S. 1438 Before Sen-
ate Finance Comm. on S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statements of Curtis H. Bar-
nette and George Scalise).
171 See id. But see World Trade Organization Oversight, 1995: Hearings Before Senate
Finance Comm. on S. 1438, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan Holmer, Part-
ner Sidney and Austin).
172 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing commission creation to
allay sovereignty concerns).
173 One option would be for public officials to spend more time properly explaining the
system to the public.
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C. In the Name of Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?
The establishment of the review commission may enhance WTO
rule compliance in a number of ways. First, a negative determina-
tion by the commission will give added impetus to implement
WTO dispute settlement panel and appellate body recommenda-
tions regarding United States laws that have been found WTO-
inconsistent. If the law is motivated by protectionism or if United
States unfair trade laws have been abused in a protectionist man-
ner, the apolitical decision of the review commission may be one
way to combat the protectionist forces that would otherwise
clamor before Congress arguing against the panel report's imple-
mentation. Within the United States policy-making system, insti-
tutional and procedural counterweights to the protectionist influ-
ence of special interests are critical to securing congressional
support for trade liberalization. 174 By acting as a counterweight,
the review commission can enhance compliance with WTO rules.
Second, the mere existence of the review commission may serve
as a positive influence, supportive of the rule-oriented system, by
helping to ensure that panels and the appellate body do not stray
from their task or exceed their powers. 175 This positive influence
is likely to spread beyond cases in which the United States is a
party. Such dissemination might occur in a variety of ways. In
interpreting a provision, subsequent panels may follow a previous
panel's exercise of judicial restraint in not adding to rights or obli-
gations of the Members. ' 76 Development of procedural and conflict
of interest rules for panelists and the appellate body may be fur-
thered by the existence of the review commission. 177 These devel-
opments may, in turn, increase the respect of Members for WTO
panel and appellate body decisions, resulting in a second possible
174 DEsmER, supra note 73, at 3.
175 See World Trade Organization Oversight, 1995: Hearings Before Senate Finance
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1995) (statement of Jerry Junkins, Chairman, Texas
Instruments Inc.).
176 See Vienna Convention, supra note 149. As a matter of law, previous panel reports
have no stare decisis effect. This is in accordance with the general rules of international
law. In practice, however, many GATT panels have relied on the reasoning of prior panels
(as persuasive), although there have been a few instances in which a GATT panel has ex-
pressly refused to follow a prior panels reasoning or decision.
177 A Code of Conduct for panelists has been under discussion within the WTO since the
beginning of 1995. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Body Chair Compiles Names for Ap-
pellate Body, 12 Inl Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 715 (Apr. 26, 1995). The Uruguay Round
Agreements Implementing Act requires the United States Trade Representative to seek
establishment of rules governing conflicts of interests. Id.
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way in which the review commission can enhance WTO rule
compliance. 17
The creation of the review commission, however, is certainly not
without risk in terms of WTO rule compliance. Important ques-
tions must be considered. Will panelists or appellate body mem-
bers be overly timid in ruling against the United States for fear of
an affirmative determination by the review commission? What if
other powerful countries create their own national review commis-
sions? Will this signal a return to the power-oriented approach?
Will review commission members be familiar enough with inter-
national law and international trade rules to conduct properly
their examination and thus avoid making improper affirmative
determinations? 179
One fear expressed by overseas trading partners regarding the
Dole Bill is that panelists or appellate body members will be un-
duly influenced by the possibility of an affirmative determination
by the United States review commission. Undue influence on pan-
elists would have negative implications for the goal of maximizing
WTO rule compliance. This concern seems greatly minimized,
however, if the review commission remains comprised of federal
circuit court justices with a limited scope of review.
Proposals to include representatives of business and labor on
the review commission, or to establish a separate review commis-
sion with these representatives, 0 are not present in the latest
version of the bill. Adoption of such proposals would change the
nature of the commission and probably its mission even if the four
criteria to be examined by the commission remained the same.'
178 See Rules-Based Dispute Settlement Called Useless Without Enforcement, 12 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1266 (July 26, 1995) (noting that WTO credibility hinges on
effective dispute settlement system).
179 See World Trade Organization Oversight, 1995: Hearings Before Senate Finance
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1995) (statement of Honorable Stanley S. Harris, Judge
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia) (discussing expertise in
international trade law required for commission members to review WTO procedures).
180 See Senator Dole Places WTO Legislation on Senate Calendar for this Session, 12 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2049, 2049 (Dec. 13, 1995) (describing Sen Byrd's proposal);
see also Dole Fails in Bid for Senate Approval of WTO, Banana Bills, 13 INSIDE U.S. TRADE
6 (Oct. 13, 1995).
11 See Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Byrd Blocks Senate Consideration of Bill to Set up WTO
Review Commission, 12 Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) No. 33, at 1380 (Aug. 16, 1995) (noting
Byrd's remarks concerning business interest representation on review commission). But see
Whitney Debevoise and Nancy L. Perkins, U.S. Bill Would Weaken WTO Dispute Process,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4. 1995, at C6 (discussing proposed amendments to Dole bill calling for
establishing additional advisory commissions comprised of private sector members).
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It is possible that private sector participation on the review com-
mission would taint determinations.'" 2 These participants, in con-
trast to judges, are more likely to be influenced by a panel or ap-
pellate body report's economic impact on the United States
business or labor interests involved.183 In the worst case scenario,
a member or members of the review commission comprised of
business or labor interests might maintain a conflict of interest.
Federal appellate judges will be free of any conflicts of interest.
The appellate judges' review presumably will be neutral with re-
spect to the economic interests of a particular case. A review com-
mission comprised of appellate judges is consistent with the over-
all long-term United States national economic interest in an
effective dispute settlement system that is not subject to abuse. In
addition, WTO dispute settlement panels and the appellate body
perform a legal function. Appellate judges are better qualified to
review whether a legal function has been properly performed than
business or labor leaders. 18 4
If the review commission is to act as a second filter beyond the
right to appeal at the international level, it is essential that the
commission remain judicial in nature. In other words, while some
have advocated that the review commission conduct a completely
182 See World Trade Organization Oversight: 1995 Hearings on S. 16 Before Senate Fi-
nance Comm. on S. 16, [hereinafter Hearings] 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of
Curtis H. Barnette) ("Filling the [review] Commission with people other than federaljudges would clearly be a mistake. Members of the academic community might be seen to
have biases or points of view inconsistent with the neutral perspective required for mean-
ingful review. Similarly, use of private trade lawyers would only give rise to questions
about conflicts of interest and the qualification of these individuals to act in the role ofjudges."); Hearings, supra (statement of Alan Wolff) ("Former judges or other attorneys in
active practice will not guarantee the level of independence necessary for the Review Com-
mission. Without sufficient independence, the Commission's value as a check on the opera-
tion of WTO panels will be undermined."); Hearings, supra (statement of George Scalise)
(".... sitting federal judges are best suited to render impartial rulings since, by the very
nature of their positions, they must act without conflicts of interest."). But see Judge Ques-
tions U.S. Bill to Create WTO Review Panel, REuTERs, LnD., May 10, 1995 (discussing fed-
eral judge's doubts about review commission judicial composition). If federal judges cannot
serve for constitutional reasons, then retired federal judges would be the next best
composition.
183 See generally Hearings, supra note 182.
184 See id. (testimony of Curtis Barnette) ("our federal appellate judges.., are uniquely
qualified to engage in the type of review envisioned by [the Dole Bill]"); Hearings, supra
note 182 (testimony of George Scalise) (". . . federal appellate judges . . . are the most
qualified candidates for the role. Since their primary judicial function is to review determi-
nations of lower courts and federal agencies, they are best suited to evaluate a WTO panel's
interpretation of the Uruguay Round agreements."). But see Marianne Lavelle, Federal
Judges Cast Wary Eye on Trade Panel, NAT'L L.J., May 22, 1995, at A16 (noting skepticism
of federal judges as to ability to review aspects of international trade law).
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de novo review of panel and appellate body reports, it is important
to limit the scope of review undertaken by the commission.
Modifications could be made to the proposed review commission
to further increase the likelihood that it will not detract from the
proportion of rule-orientation within the WTO dispute settlement
system. For instance, the bill could make clear that commission
members shall use customary international law rules of interpre-
tation when examining agreements under the four criteria within
the scope of review and may not rely on unilateral United States
interpretations.1 8 5 The United States government might disagree
with a dispute settlement panel's interpretation of an agreement,
but the commission's role seems to be limited to determining
whether the WTO panel has performed its task properly. Accord-
ing to the DSU, panels and the appellate body are to use custom-
ary international law rules of interpretation. 8 6 Therefore, in de-
termining, for instance, whether a panel or the appellate body has
added to the rights or obligations of the United States under a
WTO agreement, the commission should use the same rules of in-
terpretation the panel does with respect to the agreement.
Perhaps the absence of this modification is insignificant in light
of the fact that this interpretational approach appears to be inher-
ent in the role of the commission. Concerns have been raised,
however, that commission members may not be sufficiently famil-
iar with international law to apply this approach properly. Fur-
ther, a general standard of review, in addition to the scope of re-
view, might be elaborated for the commission itself.18 7 (This, of
course, would mean a standard of review for the commission as to
whether WTO panels or the appellate body deviated from their
standard of review!)
185 See World Trade Organization Oversight, 1995: Hearings Before Senate Finance
Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Alan Holmer, Partner, Sidley & Aus-
tin). "Judges on the Dole Commission should be allowed to offer their independent judge-
ment based on the standard of review established in the WTO agreement concerned, rather
than a standard established unilaterally by the United States." Id.
186 See DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2, at 115. "The Members recognize that [the dispute
settlement system] serves ... to clarify the existing provisions of [WTO] agreements in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law." Id. Under
the former GATT system, panels in some instances did not follow the rules of customary
international law and instead resorted almost immediately to secondary sources of inter-
pretation. See also Kuyper, supra note 88, at 229 (noting adherence to customary interna-
tional law rules of interpretation).
187 Some of the criteria, specifically numbers one and three, in the proposed commis-
sion's scope of review do contain a standard of review such as "demonstrably." The other
criteria, however, specifically numbers two and four, do not contain any standard of review.
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It is a fine line to draw between whether a national review com-
mission adds an additional element of power-orientation or is a
positive force within a rule-oriented system. On which side of this
line any proposal for a national review commission falls depends
on numerous factors, including the proposed composition and
scope of review. However, it appears on balance that a properly
comprised and constrained U.S. review commission can further
the goal of enhanced WTO rule compliance while at the same time
eliminating any perceived sovereignty concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The new WTO dispute settlement system is more "judicial" than
the old GATT system. The new system eliminates several political
"checks" existing under the old GATT system, increasing the de-
gree of rule-orientation in the system. As a result of these
changes, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding will en-
hance compliance (or the likelihood of compliance) with the ex-
panded and strengthened substantive rules of the international
trading system. One must be careful, however, not to simply con-
duct a statistical analysis of cases when judging the success of the
new system in five, ten or twenty years. The new system will ad-
dress disputes arising out of stronger substantive rules in politi-
cally sensitive areas and in a broader array of areas. The new
system might also attract cases that countries would not have con-
sidered under the old system because of perceptions that the sys-
tem was ineffective. However, the new system will be more adept
at counteracting domestic political pressures that lead to protec-
tionist, WTO-inconsistent measures.
Concerns exist within the United States that the new system
presents a threat to U.S. sovereignty. An analysis of the new sys-
tem using the two most common definitions of sovereignty indi-
cates these concerns are misplaced. Other major "sovereignty
clothed" critiques have also been overstated and ignore the U.S.
national interest served by the new system.
Nonetheless, a proposal to create a national commission com-
prised of federal appellate judges to review WTO panel and appel-
late body decisions adverse to the United States arose out of per-
ceived sovereignty concerns. While eliminating these perceptions
is one function a national review commission might serve, the na-
tional review commission could serve an additional function of en-
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hancing compliance with WTO rules. In general, WTO rules are
designed to constrain measures with a protectionist purpose or de-
sign. The national review commission can act as a counterweight
to protectionist interests and thus enhance the probability of im-
plementing panel reports adverse to the United States.
The national review commission can also act as a positive influ-
ence supporting the shift to a more rule-oriented dispute settle-
ment system. Its influence could enhance respect for the system
and ultimately enhance compliance. Clearly, the establishment of
a review commission is not without risk. On balance, however, a
properly comprised and constrained national review commission
can serve to enhance compliance with WTO rules and thus protect
our citizenship and consumer interests from special, protectionist
interests.
